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THE EROSION OF THE CONCEPT OF DEVELOPMENT: PROBLEMS
IN ESTABLISHING A MATERIAL CHANGE OF USE.
The concept of development for the purposes of s.55 of the Town and Country
Planning Act 1990 is a  jurisdictional one: its purpose is to establish  the
threshold  of a local authority's powers to control land use.  In the absence of
cognisable development  landowners  enjoy  such powers  as the common law
bestows to use  land as  they see fit.  This embraces a right to undertake
activities  which cause harm to neighbouring land where these fall short of a
public or private nuisance.    This means that the law tolerates the infliction of
some injury to the enjoyment of neighbouring land provided no statutory or
common law rule is  thereby infringed.    Certain limited detrimental activity
cannot, by itself,  trigger the intervention of either the aggrieved neighbour, nor
of the State.  Development falling within the definition of section 55 of the
Town and Country Planning Act 1990 thus establishes the powers of the local
planning authority to control the detrimental activity.
Once its jurisdiction is established, the local authority must then decide whether
or not to consent to the use in question.  This is a matter of planning merits to
be  considered  in accordance with ss. 54A and 70  of the 1990 Act.    Thus
there are two distinct and separate issues,  for which Parliament has enacted
different provisions of the 1990 Act.  First it must be asked: is the jurisdiction
of the planning authority over the use established? (1)   Only  if the answer to
this question is in the affirmative  is the authority entitled to proceed to the
second issue which requires a decision on the planning merits of the matter (2).
The purpose of the present article is to  argue that these distinct issues have
become conflated.  In this confusion it may be possible to identify a broad
intention on the part of some planning authorities to use planning powers as a
means of curbing (i) activity which has off-site consequences  which ought only
to be relevant as issues of planning merit if (and only if) a material change of
use can be established,  and  (ii)  unconventional activity with  certain off-site
consequences.  In either case it is possible to identify some marginalisation of
the concept of development in s.55 of the Town and Country Planning Act
1990.  A material change of use can now, it seems, be established not merely by
reference to the change  in use of the planning unit but also by reference to its
consequences, (the merits question) and in particular whether off-site harm can
be identified.  The danger of this approach  is that, in some cases, it may
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contrary to established principles of the general Administrative law.
It is proposed  to focus on cases in the  first category, that is cases where a
material change of use can be established by reference to off-site consequences,
and then to examine the  second category in which unconventional activity
takes place, and it is alleged that this use is incidental to the enjoyment of a
dwellinghouse as such. ( 3)
 Off-site Consequences of Development and the Threshold Question
The expansion of planning powers has resulted from the conflation of  the
fundamentally different issues of planning jurisdiction and planning merits.  An
early decision in which this confusion can be identified is Panayi v. Secretary
of state for the Environment (4) where the alleged change of use concerned the
change of a property divided into four self-contained flats into  one used as a
hostel for homeless persons.  Kennedy J. held that although the new use
remained classed as  residential the Inspector had been entitled to hold that the
property had so altered in character that a material change of use had taken
place.  "It was certainly open to the inspector to decide that, if a building that
contained four self-contained flats, even without structural alterations, became
a hostel for homeless persons, that could amount to a material change of use.
The change could give rise to  important planning considerations  and could
affect, for example, the residential character of the area, strain the welfare
services, reduce the stock of private accommodation available for renting and
so forth.  The fact that, in the broadest sense the property continued to be used
for residential purposes does not mean that there could not have been a material
change of use..."  (Emphasis supplied)
The reference to the off-site consequences as "important planning
considerations" at first appears unobjectionable: each example identified is a
material consideration on determining whether planning permission ought to be
granted for any material change of use.  But before this issue falls to be
considered the prior question (has a material change of use occurred) must be
answered in the affirmative.   A close examination of his lordship's judgment
reveals that the same considerations are deployed in his consideration of this
jurisdictional matter as those in relation to the issue  of planning merits.  Thus
the  "important planning considerations" enjoy a dual function; and they are
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two separate sections of the 1990 Act. (5)    In essence, off-site harm is
identified not only a a merits issue but also as a threshold issue establishing the
jurisdiction of the planning authority to intervene.
This may be so for reasons of policy. If the consequences are perceived as
detrimental, controls can only be triggered if a material change of use has taken
place.   If development  has not taken place, planning powers cannot be
invoked.  Thus the judiciary may be tempted to hold that off-site harm which
may become relevant in planning terms as an issue of planning merits is also
relevant in  making it  more likely that any change of use will be "material".
Thus two statutory provisions, each relying on an idea of materiality,  have
essentially been merged into one lest detrimental activity should escape the net.
This conflation can be identified in other decisions of which Lilo Blum v.   
Secretary of State for the Environment and Richmond upon Thames LBC  (6)
marks an important development, since the merger of the two issues was openly
acknowledged.   Here an enforcement notice had been served  alleging that a
material change of use had occurred when livery stables were additionally  used
as a riding school.  This notice was broadly upheld by the Inspector on appeal
and subsequently by the High Court where Simon Brown J.  considered that the
Inspector had found that the character of the use had changed. (7)   In part this
was so because there would be more horse traffic involving riders travelling
along  bridle ways in a conservation area (an issue which the Inspector had also
identified as the main issue relevant to the planning merits to be considered on
the deemed application for permission).  This increased use of the bridle ways
was likely to damage them.  Here again the issue of effect of off-site harm  had
controversial consequences.  These might be identified as follows:
1. The single issue of off-site harm to the bridle ways was found to be relevant
both to whether a change of use had occurred and whether that change merited
planning permission; and
2.  planning powers were  held to be appropriately used to preclude the
increased horse use of paths.  This is interesting when it is recalled that these
paths were dedicated as bridle ways and so expressly provided for  horse use  as
one of their primary functions. (8)  It is difficult to see how planning law can
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the surface.  The question of  damage should be considered in relation to the
duty of the highway authority is to keep such paths in repair.(9)   That it cannot
do so for lack of funds seems an insufficient  to ration the lawful use of the
bridle ways by resort to  planning powers to slow the rate of their decline.   This
does invite the conclusion that   planning powers  may be employed for an
ulterior purpose. (10)
The relevance of off-site harm in the identification of a material change of use
was finally confirmed in Forest of Dean District Council v. Secretary of State
for the Environment & Howells. (11)   Here the propriety of considering off-site
detriment in determining whether a change of use was material formed the ratio
of the decision.
In this case an appeal was instituted against the decision of an Inspector who
had quashed an enforcement notice.  This had been  issued to restrain the
change of use of static holiday caravans to  permanent residential
accommodation.  On  appeal it was argued for the  respondent that no proper
distinction could be drawn between human habitation of a caravan  site for one
purpose as opposed to another.  The character of the use remained the same.
(12)
There was, however,  substantial evidence at the inquiry that traffic using the
site would be increased by the change to permanent residential user.  The
Inspector had not considered that issue since, in his opinion, it was irrelevant.
In his view  the question whether a material change of use had taken place had
to be judged in relation to the site itself and not the effects on road use off-site.
(13)  Thus the question directly raised in this appeal was whether off-site harm
could be relevant in determining whether a change in land use was material, or
whether it went instead to planning merits. (14)
 David Widdecombe QC held that the "off-site effects... were relevant to the
question whether development had taken place."  This is to be read with the
subsequent passage in which his lordship stated:  "It made a nonsense of
planning if the effects of use on neighbouring land had to be ignored."  (15)
5 As in Panayi  David Widdecombe QC appeared here to be drawing upon the
off-site consequences of  a change in use (which may be relevant to the
planning merits)  and holding them to be  as  relevant to the threshold question
as they are the merits issue.   The question is whether this is permissible.  This
is discussed further below.
The confusion of planning jurisdiction and planning merits can subtly, but
nevertheless extensively, widen the scope of planning powers.   This can be
seen in the following examples  which are derived from those to which  Lord
Parker  CJ made reference in Birmingham Corporation v. Habib Ullah (16) and
which, under orthodox planning rules, do not involve development.  In the first
example,  a young childless couple move into a large dwellinghouse in a
residential area. A number of unruly children are born to them  so that after
number of years they have a large family. Elderly and infirm relatives also
come to live on the premises  to  receive care in the family.  The impact of this
family on the area is not inconsiderable and may be very similar to that which
caused so much concern in Panayi:  its presence  could affect, for example, the
residential character of the area (as unruly children often do),  strain the welfare
services and education services, reduce the stock of private accommodation
available for renting, increase traffic and parking difficulties, and so forth.
These are all examples of off-site harm which are coupled with a significant
increase (or "intensification" (17)) in the number of residents of the house.  Yet
there would have  been  no doubt that there is no material change of use and no
development in a case of this kind. (18)   However, if detrimental off-site
consequences can be considered  as relevant to the threshold question it is
appropriate to ask whether the conclusion concerning this kind of case has
altered, and if so how?    In endeavouring to answer this question  certain
difficulties are presented.
Two further examples may  serve to clarify these issues:
(i) Let it be supposed that  a dynamic entrepreneur acquires a run-down bicycle
shop and makes it profitable.  The enterprise  becomes extremely active;  a
larger number of (off road) cycles are sold.  Many of these cycles are ridden  on
the  woodland site on the edge of the town.  This  results in damage to the
public woodland paths.   Local residents object to the state of the paths and  ask
the planning authority to serve an enforcement notice restricting bicycle sales.
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the widest interpretation of s.55 there has been no material change of use.  In
planning terms the status quo ante the sale of the business and post its
renaissance is such that there has been no material change.  Arguments based
on intensification are unlikely to succeed on the facts. (19)
(ii)  Now let it be assumed that the facts are as in (i) above but that the shop
owner wishes to enhance the business even further by advertising.   This is
done by sponsoring and organising a cycling team.  The team members
commute to and from the premises for training advice,  meet on the premises,
and train on and off neighbouring roads including  riding in the above
mentioned woods thereby increasing damage to woodland paths.  Can the local
planning authority  serve an enforcement notice on these facts?
The position is less clear than in example (i) above because it might arguably
be analogous to the Lilo Blum case.  The increased road and off-road use
caused by the cyclists  is off-site harm to which can be added, perhaps, the
change in the balance of uses in the shop (since cycling advice, otherwise
incidental to retail use, now takes place in a more structured training
environment).
If the analogy with Lilo Blum  is permissible it  follows that the cycle shop must
apply for planning permission to run a cycle team.    This conclusion seems
insupportable in land use terms.  Nevertheless, this would seem to follow from
the recent case-law.  The off-site effects are of a serious nature and  detrimental
to the environment.  The change in use of the shop (to provide a base for a
cycle team) may also makes the question of development on the grounds of
intensification somewhat near the border.  If so, the court may be especially
tempted to focus on off-site effects to determine whether the change of use is a
material one.
However, the cycle shop is essentially being required to seek planning
permission in order to makes its business more successful.  The impermissible
nature of such  an outcome is supported by well-established authority.  This
holds that no material change of use  occurs where a significant change occurs
in the conduct of a retail business such that its success causes increased activity
or an appearance detrimental to the neighbourhood.  (20)  The presence of a
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residential area is not sufficient to trigger the jurisdiction of the planning
authority.
Materiality
 It is arguable that  the error in treating  off-site harm as relevant to the
threshold question is  confusion over different meanings of materiality which is
used in all three relevant sections of the 1990 Act.  Of these,  s.55 relates to
development (the threshold question), and ss 54A and s 70 with the  decision
whether or not to grant planning permission (the planning merits)
 s.55  (omitting references to operational development) states that  development
occurs  upon  the making of any material change of use of any buildings or
other land.
Section 54A of the Town and Country Planning Act 1990 states: "Where in
making any determination under the planning Acts, regard is to be had to the
development plan, the determination shall be made in accordance with the plan
unless material considerations indicate otherwise."
s.70 (1)   provides: "Where an application is made to a local planning authority
for planning permission.....  (a) they may grant permission, either conditionally
or subject to such conditions as they think fit;
or
(b) they may refuse planning permission
In dealing with such a planning application the authority shall have regard to
the provisions of the development plan so far as material to the application and
any other material consideration."
 Thus the draftsman has incorporated a reference to materiality in all three
sections.  It is not at all clear, however, that  materiality for the purposes of s.55
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s.55.  Yet this appears to be what the courts are suggesting in cases like Panayi,
Lilo Blum and Howells because, as has been demonstrated,  a matter which is
undoubtedly an issue going to planning merits (off site consequences of a new
or altered use) is deemed to be a "material consideration" for the purposes of
s55 (whether a change of use is material).
 It is doubtful whether the draftsman intended the idea of  materiality to bear
the same meaning under each of the three sections.   In ss.  54A and 70
materiality  appears in the context of planning merits where the local authority
must have regard to the development plan and to other material considerations.
Here materiality simply directs the attention of the planning authority to
relevant issues affecting the planning merits of the application.  No regard is to
be had to immaterial or irrelevant matters.
For the purposes of s54A and s.70 it is commonplace that material
considerations  must be considerations of a planning nature which relate to the
character of the use of   land, (21) although they need not be restricted to
matters of amenity. (22)   The s.55 threshold question is different.   This asks
whether there has been a   material change of use, and the issues which are
relevant to this question are very different from the question of planning merits.
A change is material if   the change is substantial.  This has been  interpreted
in Palser v. Grinling (23)  to mean "considerable solid, big". It does not mean
"not insubstantial or de minimis".  Thus materiality examines whether   the
alleged change of use has occurred to such a degree that it is material for the
purposes of the section.  According to one view,  it can be argued that this
mandates an examination of the change itself and not of any off-site
consequences of that change.   It is the change of use which must be material
and not the change in consequences of that use.    To put the matter differently:
s.55 mandates that the change must be material.  If it is material  development
has occurred and there is no reason to consider off-site harm at this threshold
stage.   If the change is immaterial, no development has occurred. Off-site harm
cannot make an immaterial change material without serious erosion of the
concept of development and the very broad extension of planning powers.
 However if this is unduly simplistic and  the courts are indeed to resolve
border-line threshold cases by references to off-site harm on the grounds that
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difficulties seem  daunting.  If the  examples  offered above are correct, it might
be asked  whether it is truly the purpose of planning law to require the cycle-
shop owner to seek planning permission to run a cycle team  where  the cyclists
in the team might increase road and off-road traffic?   Would the family
inhabiting the  large dwellinghouse  be required to seek  planning permission
when they have children or wish to move in elderly relations?   If the answer to
one or both of these  questions is in the negative, in what threshold cases is off-
site harm relevant? How is a distinction to be drawn between cases where it is
to be ignored and cases where it is determinative?
The concern of the local planning authority for off-site consequences (the loss
of visual and other amenity enjoyed by neighbours) perhaps also lead to the
marginalisation of the concept of development  in Croydon LBC v. Gladden.
(24)   Here  the Court of Appeal had to decide whether to uphold an appeal
against injunctions granted under s.187B of the 1990 Act which (inter alia)
sought to restrain the  appellant from placing a full size replica of a Spitfire in
the back garden of a small suburban property. Importantly, one of the
appellant's purposes in wishing to place the replica in the garden was to annoy
the local council.
 The Court of Appeal rejected an argument based on s.55 (2) (d) of the 1990
Act which if applicable would have removed from control "the use of any land
within the curtilage of a dwellinghouse for any purpose incidental to the use of
the dwellinghouse as such" and unanimously upheld the injunctions (although
with slight amendment).
Dillon LJ followed the earlier decision of the same Court in Wallington v.
Secretary  of State for Wales  (25)   and held that the enjoyment of a
dwellinghouse  as such could not as a matter of law  be determined
subjectively; it demanded an element of objective reasonableness.   It was not,
in his lordship's opinion, reasonable to place a replica Spitfire in a small garden,
a fortiori where it was done with the  intention of annoying the local planning
authority; and so the exemption in s.55 (2) (d) was not applicable on the facts.
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Stuart-Smith LJ accepted that it was a question of fact and degree whether the
Spitfire could be incidental to the enjoyment of a dwellinghouse as such.
However his lordship was careful to note that certain unconventional uses-such
as the placing of a unconventional statue could still be regarded as erected for a
purpose incidental to the enjoyment of a dwellinghouse.  However, the Spitfire
was a plain case because it was done for the purpose of "teasing" the local
authority.
Hobhouse LJ agreed with both judgments.
Two observations might be made upon this decision.  The first concerns the
marginalisation of development.  A consideration of s.55 (2) (d) only becomes
apposite where development takes place; indeed, it only applies where a
material change of use (as opposed to  operational development)   takes place.
If any change in use was insufficient otherwise to constitute development, it
would not be appropriate to examine s.55 (2) (d).  It is trite law that this is a
matter of fact and degree, but it is by no means clear that even the placing of
even a disproportionately large object on land comprising the rear garden is
sufficient.  This is an important matter because, as we have seen, the s.55 (2)
(d) exemption is limited by notions of reasonableness which seem to draw
heavily upon conventionality.  It would be unnecessary to consider the
reasonableness or otherwise of the activity if no material change of use had
occurred.
 To return to the isue of whether placing an  object in a garden is a material
change of use it should be noted  that the planning unit is the dwellinghouse
which remains used as such throughout; the use has not even been "intensified".
It is arguable that a model train enthusiast who uses the garden for an extension
of his model layout rather than the cultivation of ornamental plants does not
require planning permission to enjoy the trains. (26)   The Spitfire is perhaps
only a different case because of  its relative size.  If so, this in turn raises  the
difficult question of the impact of the replica on neighbouring property, and
thus we  return to the  controversial issue of employing off-site harm to
establish development.
Nevertheless, whether or not development had occurred was not extensively
considered; it appears to have been assumed (contrary to the above) that it did
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occur,  for otherwise their lordships  would not have progressed to consider the
s.55 (2) (d) exemption. (27)
  Questions must also be posed about  the scope of  s.55 (2) (d).  If it can be
assumed that the placing of the Spitfire in the garden constituted a material
change of use  it must be a matter of concern that unconventional uses of land-
which fall short of either a statutory or common law nuisance-should be within
the scope of planning control.  A rational argument asserts that land use which
is not a private or public nuisance is land use which neighbours must tolerate,
even if some (reasonable) detriment is inflicted by it.  It seems bizarre that a
householder should have to seek planning permission to keep a seventh dog.
(28)    Yet according to the Stuart-Smith LJ the placing of an unconventional
statue, a "Wendy House", a gypsy caravan or a pirate ship for children's
enjoyment" could still be within the s.55 (2) (d) exemption.  But   it seems that
a replica Spitfire is not to be included in this list, at least on the facts of
Gladden.   It must be a question of fact but the difference in planning terms
between a replica aircraft and a pirate ship are not immediately obvious.  Both
are capable of being substantial structures and may have some impact on visual
amenity.  (29)
 But this does not conclude the issue because it  will be recalled that Gladden's
motives in wishing to place the replica in his garden included the annoyance
and teasing of the local authority.   Much emphasis was placed upon the issue
of motive, and this was  particularly so in the case of  Stuart-Smith LJ.
Whether or not it can be satisfactory in land use terms to regard motive as
determinative of the need to seek planning permission is open to doubt because
identical uses might be treated differently if undertaken with different motives.
However, if motive is now relevant,  it may be more satisfactory to regard the
decision in Gladden decision as confined to cases where the motive for
development is not bona fide.  The test would seem to be that the words in s.55
(2) (d) ("enjoyment of a dwellinghouse as such") require an enjoyment of the
object  in the context of the  dwellinghouse, and not as a means of pursuing an
off-site vendetta, or of inflicting harm on others.  Simply put,  the  occupier
should seek pleasure in the use or object  for its own sake and  in the context of
the dwellinghouse and not as an means of perplexing or harming others.  This is
surely the true rationale of Gladden which ought not to be construed more
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widely so as to constitute a curtailment of the activities of less conventional
individuals whose use of land falls short of an actionable nuisance.
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Caravan (Estates), Ltd. (1962) 14 P & CR 440,441 where the question whether
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amenities.
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491.
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(14)  Which might not fall to be considered if the change was not material.
(15)  at p. 943.
(16)  [1964] 1 QB 178.
(17)  "Intensification" here is simply meant to imply an increase in activity  but
one falling ahort of a material change in use.
(18)  Birmingham Corporation v. Habib Ullah [1964] 1 QB 178.
(19)  A businessman does not require planning permission to make a business
successful: see  Marshall v. Nottingham City Council  [1960] 1 WLR 707
where the issue of serious impact on visual amenity of the neighbourhood was
not considered sufficient to invoke planning powers in the absence of an
material change of use, and that impact did not by itself establish such a use.
(20)   Marshall v. Nottingham City Council , above.
(21)  FN  Newbury DC v. Secretary of State [1981] AC 578, 599 per Lord
Dilhorne; Westminster City Council v. Great Portland Estates  [1985] AC 661,
670; Westminster City Council v. British Railways Board [1985] AC 671.
(22)   Per Cooke J. in  Stringer v. Minister of Housing and Local Government
[1970] 1 WLR 1281 at 1294.  Contrast Lord Widgery CJ in Copeland Borough
Council v. Secretary of State (1976) 31 P & CR 403.
(23)   [1948] AC 291.
(24)  [1994] JPL 723.
(25)  (1990) 62 P & CR 150.
(26)   But this may be open to doubt after Wallington if the hobby is seen as
unreasonable in its nature or extent.
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(27)   They cannot have regarded it as operational development because   the
s.55 (2) (d) exemption would not apply to such development.
(28)  Presumably after Wallington  if a bitch has six or more puppies a solicitor
must now advise that planning permission be sought. It is true that the inspector
in Wallington had not identified six as the upper maximum limit of the number
of dogs, but he was entitled to conclude that the enforcement notice could
permit a maximum of six dogs to avoid over-enforcement.
(29)    Indeed it is possible to argue that  a different distinction  from that drawn
by his lordship applies.  This is because the pirate ship, as a structure, might
constitute operational development whereas a replica Spitfire (presumably on
wheels) would not be. See ss 55 and 336 of the 1990 Act and Wealden DC v.
Secretary of State  [1988] JPL 268 respectively.
